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A cross-national study, 49 samples in 38 nations (n = 4,344), inves-
tigates whether national peace and conflict reflect ambivalent
warmth and competence stereotypes: High-conflict societies (Pakistan)
may need clearcut, unambivalent group images distinguishing friends
from foes. Highly peaceful countries (Denmark) also may need
less ambivalence because most groups occupy the shared national
identity, with only a few outcasts. Finally, nations with interme-
diate conflict (United States) may need ambivalence to justify
more complex intergroup-system stability. Using the Global Peace
Index to measure conflict, a curvilinear (quadratic) relationship be-
tween ambivalence and conflict highlights how both extremely
peaceful and extremely conflictual countries display lower stereo-
type ambivalence, whereas countries intermediate on peace-conflict
present higher ambivalence. These data also replicated a linear
inequality–ambivalence relationship.
stereotypes | peace | conflict | inequality | ambivalence
Objective and social environmental factors affect individualpsychology (e.g., ref. 1). Geography and climate, as well as
economic, political, and religious systems, influence thinking and
action (2, 3). For instance, income inequality worsens social
cohesion (e.g., refs. 4, 5), quality of governance supports well-
being (6), and natural environments improve self-regulation (7).
Here, conflict within and between societies can predict group
stereotypes.
According to the stereotype content model (SCM) (8), stereo-
types are not just negative; many societal stereotypes are instead
ambivalent, combining positive and negative descriptions of a
group. Stereotypes array along two fundamental dimensions of
social perception, namely, warmth (sociability, sincerity) and
competence (capability, skill); ambivalent stereotypes portray
groups as either warm but not competent (disabled people) or as
cold but competent (rich people). Groups penalized on one di-
mension are compensated on the other (9). The positive de-
scription may mask the negative description, making ambivalent
stereotypes acceptable even to targets (e.g., ref. 10). Mixed
combinations rationalize the system.
Warmth and competence map group stereotypes across soci-
eties (11, 12), and many societies’ stereotypes are ambivalent
(13). However, societies vary in use of ambivalent stereotypes,
and such variations link to income inequality: More unequal
societies display more ambivalent stereotypes (11). If ambiva-
lence helps maintain societal hierarchies, more equal societies
may stereotype fewer groups ambivalently, because most groups
deserve inclusion in the social safety net. Relatively unequal
societies, instead, may need more ambivalence to mask income
disparities, rationalizing unfair conditions, namely, by mixed
stereotypes (e.g., deserving and undeserving poor). In support
(14), poor people appear less competent (but warmer) and rich
people appear colder (but more competent) in relatively unequal
vs. equal countries: Given high inequality, the status quo may be
reinforced by undermining poor people on the status-relevant di-
mension (i.e., competence) and rich people on the status-irrelevant
dimension, thus justifying the groups’ respective positions in the
hierarchy. These data link a distal factor, inequality, with group
stereotypes.
However, inequality may also increase the odds of conflict (15–
17). Intergroup conflict abets negative stereotypes of the “enemy”
(18): Negative traits ascribed to all category members justify social
actions, dividing “us” vs. “them” (19). Conflicting parties hold
mutually negative images (20–22), reinforcing the conflict. Thus,
countries’ conflict may perpetuate us-them stereotypes.
This cross-national study investigates how a country’s peace/
conflict predicts more mixed ascriptions of warmth and compe-
tence to its groups. Low-conflict countries are, by definition,
unified: Identity is uncontested, perhaps ethnically homogeneous.
Significance
Stereotypes reflect a society’s inequality and conflict, providing
a diagnostic map of intergroup relations. This stereotype map’s
fundamental dimensions depict each group’s warmth (friendly,
sincere) and competence (capable, skilled). Some societies
cluster groups as high on both (positive “us”) vs. low on both
(negative “them”). Other societies, including the United States,
have us-them clusters but add ambivalent ones (high on one
dimension, low on the other). This cross-national study shows
peace-conflict predicts ambivalence. Extremely peaceful and
conflictual nations both display unambivalent us-them patterns,
whereas intermediate peace-conflict predicts high ambivalence.
Replicating previous work, higher inequality predicts more am-
bivalent stereotype clusters. Inequality and intermediate peace-
conflict each use ambivalent stereotypes, explaining complicated
intergroup relations and maintaining social system stability.
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Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries may be prototypes of
peaceful collectives, with harmonious shared identities. National
identity is a more unitary whole; thus, various citizen subgroups
should receive positive evaluations on both competence and
warmth, and in Western settings, favoring the in-groups (12).
Noncitizen intruders (refugees, nomads, and undocumented
migrants) are simply excluded (negatively evaluated on both di-
mensions) in our previous data.
More contested, perhaps multiethnic, identity needs more
subgroups. Friction likely rises, but conflict is moderate, given a
stable system. The Americas, a mix of indigenous peoples as well as
histories and continuing flows of immigrants, are prototypes. Na-
tional subgroups’ distinct fates (deserving vs. undeserving immi-
grants) may require explanation, namely, ambivalent stereotypes.
If open internal conflict breaks out, civil war might create stark
us-them identities, simplifying the map (less ambivalence). Di-
visions are sharpened. Similarly, if the open conflict is external
[the Global Peace Index (GPI) used here combines both internal
and external types], citizens may also create stark us-them
identities, including all citizens as a united front against external
enemies (consider the United States just after “9/11” or during
World War II).
To summarize, very peaceful countries may need less ambiv-
alence because most groups fit in the shared national identity,
with few outcasts [as earlier data (11) on highly equal societies
suggest]; high-conflict societies may also need less ambivalent
images of groups to simplify the world, making a clear-cut dis-
tinction between friends and foes (19–21); and, finally, nations
with intermediate conflict may need ambivalence for system sta-
bility due to ambiguous intergroup relations, neither fully equal
and peaceful nor fully conflictual. As a secondary aim, this work
seeks to corroborate the inequality–ambivalence relationship (11).
Overview of Present Research
The GPI measures peace-conflict, and the Gini index measures
income inequality. The GPI is produced by the Institute for
Economics and Peace, first in 2007, with updates annually. The
GPI comprises 22–24 qualitative and quantitative indicators
from various sources (e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) on three societal themes:
safety and security, domestic or international conflict, and mili-
tarization. A higher GPI means lower peace, and more conflict.
GPI coefficients consistently correlate with other measures of
peace (23). This study relates a nation’s GPI to its stereotypes.
The Gini index measures inequality in societal distribution of
income. As the American Central Intelligence Agency reports, it
plots cumulative family income against cumulative number of
families, from poorest to richest. Gini coefficients range from
0 (complete equality) to 100 (complete inequality).
Cross-national analyses used 49 samples in 38 nations (Mate-
rials and Methods; demographics are provided in Tables S1 and
S2). Each nation’s societal groups were rated on the two fun-
damental dimensions of warmth and competence (Materials and
Methods). High warmth-competence (W-C) correlations reflect
lower ambivalence, and low ones reflect more ambivalence. To
generate cultural maps and to maintain comparability with ear-
lier efforts, new stereotype content data were collected following
earlier precedents (8, 11, 12). The new data collection focused
on high-conflict countries and on extremely equal countries so as
to test the hypotheses regarding peace-conflict and ambivalence.
The new data also tested the robustness of earlier results on
inequality and ambivalence.
Results
Preliminary Analyses. Competence and warmth items related to
each societal group were averaged across participants in each
sample. Subsequently, cluster analyses explored the distribution
of means in the W × C 2D Euclidian space, using agglomerative
hierarchical cluster analysis (24) to determine the number of
clusters and k-means cluster analysis (centroids method) to es-
tablish the societal groups in each cluster. Five clusters fit for
eight of 16 new samples, and four clusters fit for the other eight.
In each sample, competence and warmth were compared within
clusters (paired t test) and between clusters (one-way ANOVAs,
post hoc Bonferroni’s correction).
We count the ambivalent groups following these criteria: (i)
Only within-cluster warmth and competence comparisons, as
well as between-cluster, within-dimension (high-low) compari-
sons, that result in P ≤ 0.05 are considered ambivalent. (ii) A few
cases of ambivalent-looking “clusters” have just one group, so
neither between- nor within-cluster comparisons are applicable.
Looking at the means, however, if we have little doubt that those
groups are evaluated ambivalently (i.e., the warmth and com-
petence means differ by a full scale point), we include those
groups as well. (iii) The new US ambivalence clusters fit the
within-cluster comparisons at P < 0.05, but one of the between-
cluster comparisons is P < 0.08, although it fits the one-scale-
point rule, and also fits several previous US studies (8, 25).
Cluster maps for all these samples are available at www.fiskelab.
org/publications, where the study by Durante et al. (11) is cited
(“To see cross-cultural warmth and competence maps, click
here”). Of course, the descriptive visual maps complement the
quantitative correlational analysis.
In Afghan, Finnish, German, Iranian, Jordanian, Norwegian,
and Turkish samples, most groups (from 60 to 90.5%) landed in
ambivalent clusters. Iraqi, Kenyan (students), Lebanese, and
Swedish groups were distributed almost equally into ambivalent
and univalent clusters. Danish, Egyptian, Kenyan (nonstudents),
Pakistani, and US groups had more groups in univalent than
ambivalent clusters.
As previously reported (11), groups’ distribution in the W × C
space presented different patterns, some as a circular cloud of
points, implying groups dispersed in the four quadrants of the
space (both ambivalent and univalent), as Fig. 1 shows. This kind
of distribution results in an approximately zero overall W-C
Fig. 1. US cluster analysis. Stars indicate cluster centroids. C, competence; H,
high; L, low; W, warmth. A regression line is plotted. The United States has
an intermediate (peace-conflict) GPI score of 2.056 and shows stereotype
ambivalence (W-C r = 0.11).
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correlation, calculated at the societal level within each sample.
Other distributions were in the shape of a linear vector (Figs. 2
and 3, from the bottom left to the top right), with most groups
evaluated univalently as high or low on both dimensions,
resulting in a positive W-C correlation. In one case, a vector ran
from the bottom right to the top left (i.e., Jordan), indicating a
negative W-C correlation (all ambivalence). Lower W-C corre-
lations implied more ambivalence, whereas higher and positive
W-C correlations indicated less ambivalence at a societal level. In
other words, the overall W-C correlation indexed ambivalence.
The 16 new samples’W-C correlations ranged from −0.37 (P = 0.07)
to 0.92 (P < 0.001), with an average r = 0.27 (Table S3).
Cross-National Analyses. The database (49 samples) adds 16 new
W-C correlations to previous data. The combined data (Table
S4) show 26 significantly positive correlations (i.e., a univalent
vector) and 22 nonsignificant correlations (i.e., a cloud that in-
cludes ambivalent quadrants). GPI coefficients range from 1.193
[lowest conflict (Denmark)] to 3.416 [highest conflict (Afghanistan)],
with a median of 1.724. Gini coefficients range from 24.80 [low
inequality (Denmark)] to 63.10 [high inequality (South Africa)],
with a median of 36.20. Peaceful and equal countries are more
represented, but the database includes extremes of both inequality
and conflict.
Having data across continents and through many years, and
indexing ambivalence as a correlation (i.e., an effect size), meta-
analysis techniques appear appropriate. The Hedges–Olkin–
Vevea method (26, 27) was applied to the random-effect model
for unconditional inferences, allowing the overall sample to
comprise samples from different underlying populations (Sup-
porting Information). Meta-regression modeled the relationship
between the SCM index of societal ambivalence and the GPI and
Gini national indexes. Regression weighted each sample as the
inverse of sampling variance, plus a constant representing vari-
ability across population effects (28). The MetaReg SPSS macro
Fig. 2. Pakistan cluster analysis. Stars indicate cluster centroids. M, medium. A regression line is plotted. Pakistan has a high-conflict GPI score of 3.106 and
shows low stereotype ambivalence (W-C r = 0.92).
Fig. 3. Denmark cluster analysis. Stars indicate cluster centroids. A re-
gression line is plotted. Denmark has a low-conflict GPI score of 1.193 and
shows low stereotype ambivalence (W-C r = 0.58).
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(29), with maximum likelihood, estimated the model, approxi-
mating inverse variance weighting by transformed sample size.
Each correlation was Fisher-standardized (27).
The hypothesized relationship between conflict and ambiva-
lence is curvilinear (both peaceful and conflictual nations display
lower ambivalence than intermediate ones). First, to exclude the
possibility of a linear relationship, we regressed W-C Fisher-
standardized correlations onto GPI coefficients, and the model
was not significant (Q < 1). To verify a curvilinear relationship,
GPI coefficients were mean-centered, and then squared. Both
the centered GPI and squared, centered GPI were entered in the
meta-regression as independent variables, with W-C Fisher-
standardized correlations as the response. The analysis yielded
significance [Q(2) = 6.40, P = 0.041], accounting for 11.7% of the
variance. As Table 1 shows, the 95% confidence intervals (CIs)
for the linear component contained zero, whereas the 95% CIs
of the quadratic component did not, suggesting a nonmonotonic
relationship between ambivalence and conflict. [The estimate of
the intercept variance is ν = 0.12, SE(ν) = 0.03.] (Further tests
are discussed in Supporting Information.) As Fig. 4 illustrates,
both very peaceful and very conflictual countries show lower
ambivalence, whereas countries with intermediate conflict mostly
present higher ambivalence. Adding other societal variables [gross
domestic product (GDP) for wealth and Human Development
Fig. 4. GPI coefficients and raw W-C correlations. A curvilinear (quadratic) pattern is significant (Table 1). UCB, Universidad Catolica Boliviana; UMSA,
Universidad Mayor de San Andres; UPB, Universidad Privada Boliviana; UPB-CB, Universidad Privada Boliviana-Cochabamba.
Table 1. Inverse variance-weighted regression results:
Moderating role of GPI and Gini on ambivalence
National index b (95% CI) SE β Z P
GPI
GPI-centered −0.20 (−0.43, 0.04) 0.12 −0.28 −1.61 0.11
GPI-centered
squared
0.38 (0.08, 0.67) 0.15 0.45 2.53 0.012
Gini −0.01 (−0.02, −0.0004) 0.006 −0.29 −2.03 0.043
Mixed model (random intercept, fixed slopes); maximum likelihood estimate.
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Index (HDI) for development] does not eliminate the curvilinear
pattern, and there were no outliers (Supporting Information).
Inverse variance-weighted meta-regression also replicated in-
equality predicting ambivalence. W-C Fisher-standardized cor-
relations were regressed onto the Gini coefficients. The model
explained 8.3% of the variance [Q(1) = 4.11, P = 0.043]; the
regression coefficient was significant, and the related 95% CIs
did not contain zero (Table 1). This finding corroborates pre-
vious findings: more income inequality and more societal am-
bivalence (Supporting Information).
Discussion
The stereotype ambivalence first discovered in North America
and in some samples in Western Europe, East Asia, Africa, and
South America replicates here mainly for relatively unequal
countries intermediate on the peace-conflict continuum. Besides
admiring the middle class as high on both dimensions and rejecting
homeless people as low on both, intermediate nations, such as the
United States, find older people to be warm but incompetent and
rich people to be cold but competent, both ambivalent images that
situate some poor people as deserving and others as not (likewise
for higher status people). Ambivalent stereotypes can reinforce
inequality (11), as well as intermediate peace-conflict.
In contrast, univalent vectors appear in two kinds of nations.
First, peaceful, equal countries (Denmark) report positive ste-
reotypes for social groups that share national identity (citizens,
middle class, students, older people, retired people), but also
report negative stereotypes of societal outcasts (criminals, immi-
grants, Muslims). Univalent stereotypes can reinforce equality, but
only for the communal in-group. Second, extremely conflict-ridden
countries (Pakistan) report positive stereotypes of in-groups and
allies (Muslims in general, educated people) and negative stereo-
types of outcasts (beggars, illiterate people) and foes (Christians).
Such univalent stereotypes can reinforce conflict.
The limitations of these data suggest future research. First,
although the effect sizes are medium by social science standards and
significant by statistical convention, the variance explained is small;
other explanations for stereotype ambivalence await discovery. Still,
the data offer insights about stereotypes, especially ambivalent ones,
in conflictual societies and in peaceful, equal societies.
Second, the data include few high-conflict countries so far.
Unfortunately, we could not widen our survey among similar
countries due to inaccessibility of data. Despite this flaw, the few
high-conflict countries provided powerful insight into the am-
bivalence pattern. The GPI reveals a previously unexplored
nonmonotonic relationship in stereotype ambivalence.
Another challenge typifies cross-cultural research: Potential
confounds abound, and are not all ruled out. Similarly, broad-
brush conclusions do not capture each nation’s every particu-
larity in stereotype mapping. Our speculation that peaceful,
equal, unambivalent countries include more groups in their
shared identity, excluding those groups beyond the pale, does not
explain all groups.
Further, as comparative correlational research, the data do
not show causality. Ambivalence predicts inequality, and vice
versa; univalence predicts extremes of peace-conflict, and vice
versa. Ideally, longitudinal data could track a nation’s changing
peace-conflict score, as a natural experiment. Unfortunately, we
do not have GPI data before 2007, nor do we have longitudinal
stereotype data, except in the United States (30): Four data
points over 70+ y do not show changing ambivalence, but the
data points are not positioned by changing national peace-
conflict levels.
Finally, the GPI is a composite of both internal and external
peace-conflict, although our participants evaluated groups within
their own society. Still, the GPI calculation weights internal in-
dicators more than external ones (60% vs. 40%). This decision
relies on the “notion that a greater level of internal peace is
likely to lead to, or at least correlate with, lower external conflict;
in other words, if ‘charity begins at home,’ so might peace” (ref.
31, p. 6). More broadly, charity might also reflect inclusive group
images, expanding the in-group to include groups viewed am-
bivalently elsewhere, with resulting societal peace.
Materials and Methods
Data on societal ambivalent stereotypes came partly from an earlier database
(11) composed of 37 samples collected in 25 nations. Here, to explore the
ambivalence–conflict relationship optimally, it was pivotal to include sam-
ples drawn from highly conflictual countries, which were hard to get and
therefore absent from previous work. Similarly, to corroborate the ambiv-
alence-inequality findings, it was crucial to collect data in countries with
high equality, which were also absent from previous work. Therefore, the
earlier database (11) was integrated with 16 new samples: 13 new samples
collected between 2013 and 2014 [in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kenya (two samples: students and nonstudents), Lebanon, Pakistan, and
Turkey (i.e., countries with high conflict) and in Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden (i.e., countries with the highest available recorded level of equality,
and peace, in the world]. [In Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Pakistan, Turkey, and Kenya, participants completed the questionnaire (both
for the preliminary and main surveys) in return for about US $10.] Moreover,
we added groups’warmth and competence data from Norway (ref. 32, study
1) and Germany (33) (again, very equal countries), which were collected
independently and reanalyzed here. Notably, because the two US samples
included in the earlier database (11) were collected in the year 2000 (before
9/11 and before the GPI reports), we decided to replace them with more
recent US data (ref. 34, study 1). Additionally, we reckoned that the two
Northern Irish samples should not be included in the study because the GPI
coefficient referred to the whole UK area, therefore masking the level of
conflict in Northern Ireland. [The Institute for Economics and Peace has re-
cently released the UK Peace Index (UKPI 2013); it divides United Kingdom
into areas. “The most peaceful region in the United Kingdom is South East
England. The least peaceful region is Greater London, immediately preceded
by Scotland and Northern Ireland” (ref. 35, p. 17)]. Cross-national analyses
used 49 samples collected in 38 nations. (See also Table S5.) The Princeton
University Institutional Review Board approved all procedures, including the
consent form, and all participants provided informed consent.
Preliminary Group-Listing Study. In each country, a preliminary study identified
societal groups that could be considered as most salient. A self-administered,
open-ended questionnaire asked participants to list which types of people are
generally categorized into groups in their society, what are the low-status
groups, and what groups they belong to. [In Jordan and Afghanistan, par-
ticipants listed the criteria used by their society to categorize people into
groups (i.e., age, race, ability). In Jordan, a follow-up questionnaire asked the
same participants to provide specific examples of social groups based on the
criteria they mentioned. In Afghanistan, two local judges listed the most sa-
lient groups in the current Afghan scene; a similar approach was used by Fiske
et al. (8) in study 1.] The questionnaire was administered in the nations’
languages. (In Kenya, participants could complete the questionnaire in either
an English or Kiswahili version of the questionnaire.) In all, 406 participants
(n = 30–42), who were mostly nonstudents (62.56%) and 47.5% female, with
a weighted mean age = 28.98 y, completed the questionnaire on a voluntary
basis. Groups mentioned by at least 15% of participants then appeared in that
country’s main survey questionnaire. Across the new samples, the number of
distinct groups ranged between 16 and 37. An analogous procedure gener-
ated the list of groups in Germany (33), Norway (32), and the United States
(34). Table S1 summarizes demographic information for each sample in our
extended database: With total numbers missing for three samples, ∼1,796
participants (54.81% female, weighted mean age = 25.92) took part in
this phase.
Main Survey.
Participants. As mentioned, 13 new samples were recruited, one from each
country, except for Kenya, where we collected data from both students and
nonstudents. Respondents (n = 965) voluntarily participated in the main
survey [with sample sizes varying in the range of n = 57–132, almost all
students (91.92%), 44.25% female, weighted mean age = 24.45 y]. Samples
from Germany (n = 82, students, 54.87% female, mean age = 23.05), Norway
(n = 244, mostly nonstudents, 50% female, mean age = 35.04), and the
United States (n = 73, nonstudents, 64.38% female, mean age = 35.24) were
similar. Table S2 shows demographic information for each sample in our
Durante et al. PNAS | January 24, 2017 | vol. 114 | no. 4 | 673
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extended database: Overall, 4,344 participants (57.44% female, weighted
mean age = 23.73) participated in the main survey.
Questionnaire and procedure. Questionnaires were administered in the nations’
local languages. (In Kenya, participants could complete either an English or
Kiswahili version of the questionnaire.) For questionnaires administered in
Middle Eastern countries, the translation/back-translation procedure was
used (e.g., ref. 3). Participants in each sample evaluated the groups resulting
from their respective preliminary surveys on items reflecting the fundamental
dimensions of social perception. [We measured group status and competition
(8) plus targeted emotions and behavioral tendencies (25), but these items fall
outside the present scope and so are not presented.] More specifically, three
items assessed competence (competent, capable, and skilled), five items
assessed warmth (warm, friendly, sincere, well-intentioned, and moral),
and they were presented intermixed. [Norwegian warmth items were
friendly, warm, good-natured, and sincere; competence items were compe-
tent, confident, capable, and skillful (32). German warmth items were likeable,
warm, and good-natured; competence items were competent, competitive,
and independent (33). The recent US study (34) used bipolar items, namely,
warm-cold, friendly-unfriendly (warmth), competent-incompetent, and capa-
ble-incapable (competence), and scales ranging from 1 to 7. Main survey
procedures in Norway, Germany, and the United States were analogous to
the procedure illustrated here.] Evaluations were made on five-point scales
(1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). As in previous SCM studies, participants were
asked to evaluate groups according to the society’s point of view. To this
purpose, instructions declared that we were not interested in their personal
beliefs, rather in how they think such groups were viewed by the majority of
their fellow citizens. This guideline was intended to mitigate social desirability
issues, while identifying the culturally shared stereotypes. To avoid participant
fatigue, the group list was split into sublists in each sample. “Because results
are analyzed primarily at the group level (i.e., each group receives mean rat-
ings, which are then compared with other groups’ mean ratings), randomly
assigning different participants to rate different groups and then combining
the datasets seemed permissible” (ref. 8, p. 891). A similar procedure was used
to collect data in Norway, Germany, and the United States.
SCM Reliability. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for each SCM con-
struct were calculated across societal groups in each of the 16 new samples,
and proved generally sufficient: warmth α-range: 0.62–0.97 (median = 0.82);
competence α-range: 0.61–0.98 (median = 0.80).
GPI and Gini. Because data were gathered over many years (i.e., 2005–2014),
for each country, we matched the year of data collection with the year of
the GPI and Gini coefficients for the very same country as closely as possible
(Table S4). [GPI reports were downloaded from economicsandpeace.org/
reports/ through the years. In April 2016, only GPI reports from 2011 to 2015
were downloadable, but previous reports are available from the authors.
Gini coefficients were retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
download/index.html and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2172.html (April 11, 2016).] Because GPI was launched in 2007,
2007 GPI coefficients were held constant for all data samples collected in
prior years. Gini coefficients were not available for Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Lebanon, accordingly excluding them from the analyses involving the in-
come inequality index, which were therefore run on 46 samples.
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